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Central bank communication can be defined as the process in which the central 
bank discloses the monetary policy information to the target groups and seeks the 
information digested by the target groups. Central banks were shrouded in mystery 
previously, but now the essence of monetary policy is the art of managing expectations 
has already became received wisdom, and central banks around the world are willing 
to pursue of their monetary policy objective through central bank communication. 
Central bank communication is no longer the taboo of the central bank circles, but has 
become the new monetary policy instrument available to the central bank beyond the 
traditional tools. Although the practice had made tremendous progress, because of its 
art essence, the research of central bank communication is still in very preliminary 
status. This paper can be seen as a valuable attempt in this field. Based on the previous 
research, this paper carries out systematic theoretical research into central bank 
communication and summarizes the related international experiences aiming to fill the 
gaps in theoretical research and provide valuable guidance for the practice. 
Based on the fully literature review, this paper unfolds the research into central 
bank communication under the logic of “what is central bank communication, why is it 
desirable to carry out central bank communication, and how to implement it”. After 
defining central bank communication clearly and pointing out the relationship between 
central bank communication and the effectiveness of monetary policy, this paper 
focuses on the study of how to implement it. Firstly, this paper analyzes the three 
feasible boundaries of central bank communication and points out how to expand the 
feasible areas. Secondly, by building a Morris-Shin style model with communication 
errors, this paper successfully answers the question that when should the central bank 
talk freely, keep silent, and mumble with great incoherence, then we get the first 
fundamental principles for the effective central bank communication which says that 
the central bank should actively disclose accurate information, but for the disclosure of 
information with low accuracy, it should adopt a very cautious attitude. Thirdly, by 













successfully answers the question that which communication methods should the 
central bank take if it has decided to disclose information, the we get the second 
fundamental principles for the effective central bank communication which says that 
central bank should take the transparent communication method instead of the 
black-box-style disclosure means aiming to facilitate the use of the private information 
of agents. Fourthly, this paper makes a detailed investigation into the practices of 
central bank communication around the world, and draws some valuable experiences 
and skills. It is easy to find that the practices confirm the main conclusions of this 
paper. Finally, this paper analyzes the central bank communication practices of the 
People's Bank of China thoroughly, and puts forward some operable recommendations 
to improve the effectiveness of the central bank communication of PBC.  
The academic contribution of this paper can be expressed as follow. Firstly, this 
paper is the first attempt to carry out systematic research into central bank 
communication, the conclusion of this paper can be seen as the basic analytical 
framework for the follow-up research. Secondly, by analyzing the feasible boundaries 
of central bank communication and building two Morris-Shin style models, this paper 
successfully summarizes the basic premise and fundamental principles for the effective 
central bank communication, and these can provide scientific guidance for the practice. 
Thirdly, this paper makes a detailed investigation into the practices of central bank 
communication around the world, and draws some valuable experiences and skills.  
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密》（Secrets of the temple），即生动地刻画了联储官员金口紧闭（Tight-lipped）、
神秘难测（Secretive）、含糊其辞（Cryptic）的联储话语特征。自 1987 年 Greenspan
上任美联储主席一职，更是把美联储这种联储话语（Fedspeak）特征发挥到了极





渐深入人心，从 20 世纪 90 年代开始，各国中央银行相继摒弃以往的隐秘性惯例，
                                                        
① 把中央银行沟通理解成为中央银行话语，是为了强调其与央行实际采取的货币政策操作行为的区别，并不
排斥中央银行以书面等其他形式对外传递信息。 
② 政策无效性定理（Policy ineffectiveness theorem），即认为任何预期到的政策对实际变量都没有影响，而只
有意料之外的政策才是有效的。 


















实堡垒的 Greenspan 任内的美联储，虽然 Greenspan 言谈依旧“建设性模糊”，但
在披露货币政策决策、会议纪要、投票记录等多方面亦是不断趋向透明化，2006
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